Confirmed! The holders of licenses in Community designs may also bring claims themselves even though the license has not been entered in the register

Only some months after having given a ruling (case C-163/15)  to the effect that the holders of licenses in Community trademarks (or, rather, “European Union trademarks”, as they now are)  were entitled to bring actions for infringement against third parties even though their licenses had not been entered in the register, the Court of Justice of the European Union was asked to give a preliminary ruling on whether the holders of licenses in Community designs (as they are still called) in turn had that right.

The CJEU has given its judgment in case C-419/15 which stemmed from a request for a preliminary ruling made by the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (the German court of appeal) in connection with a dispute between two German companies. The first of the two, the plaintiff, was the holder of an exclusive unrecorded license in a Community design. The defendant was the distributor of a product which allegedly infringed that design.

In these circumstances the German court referred the following questions to the CJEU: 

• May a licensee who has not been entered in the register bring claims for infringement of the rights in a registered Community design? 

• In the affirmative, may the exclusive licensee also bring an action claiming damages on its own, or may it only intervene in an action brought by the rightholder itself?

The CJEU gives wings to compensation for moral damages

Compensation for moral damages in intellectual property infringement cases has, in the past, had to break through significant barriers and overcome considerable prejudice.  Some of those barriers are due to the very nature of the damages: it is always easier to argue that economic detriment has been suffered (when we are talking about trademarks, designs, patents or intellectual creations) than damage to the intangible or spiritual realm of the author or rightholder. Yet it is sad to think that reservations towards compensation for moral damages might also have come about as a result of a legislative deficiency.  

Directive 2004/48/EC, extending the means of protecting intellectual property rights, slotted moral damages into the context of negative economic consequences of infringement, just another aspect alongside lost profit suffered by the injured party and unfair profit made by the infringer (Art. 13.1 a).  Alternatively, the Directive provided for compensation based on a hypothetical royalty, i.e., the lump sum that would have been due if the infringer had requested the pertinent authorisation (Art. 13.1 b).

This gave the impression that if the plaintiff opted for this alternative criterion for assessing the value of the damages, i.e., the hypothetical royalty, moral damages could not enter into the equation. The Spanish lawmaker had followed this legislative anomaly to the letter, thanks to Act 19/2006, and applied it to all forms of intellectual property: the Trademark Act, the Patent Act, the National Designs Act and the consolidated wording of the Spanish Copyright Act.

It was the Court of Justice, in its judgment of 17 March 2016 in case C-99/15, which ultimately put things in their place. That judgment stemmed from a reference for a preliminary ruling made by the Spanish Supreme Court concerning the regulation of moral damages in copyright. The plaintiff (the director, screenwriter and producer of an audiovisual work) had sued the producer of a documentary that included passages of his work for infringement of his rights. The plaintiff had selected the compensatory criterion of the fee for unauthorised use of his work but also requested 10,000 Euros for moral damages. The Supreme Court wanted to know whether moral damages could additionally be requested in such cases. 

In its judgment, the Court of Justice clarified that a provision of EU law must be interpreted not just in terms of its wording, but also in terms of its context and the objectives that it pursues; that compensation for damages must seek to ensure full compensation for the prejudice actually suffered; and that hypothetical royalties only cover “material” damage. There is therefore nothing to prevent the rightholder from also being able to claim compensation for any “moral” damages suffered.  

This judgment is extremely significant due to its side effects: its clarifying scope extends to trademark, patent and design law. However, if the judgment gives wings to moral damages, we should not try to fly too high. There are rules governing moral damages too, and, just like Icarus, we could end up falling into the sea with our wings burned for flying too close to the sun, and this time a legislative deficiency would not be to blame!    

Author: Antonio Castán

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Is proof of damages required in Spain if patentee opts for equivalent royalty?

Article 13 of the Enforcement Directive 2004/48/CE rather confusingly seems to equate equivalent royalty with damages, whereas in many continental legal systems it might fit more easily into the category of unjust enrichment i.e. the infringer has obtained something to which he has no legitimate right. 

The reference to damages, which has been transposed in Article 66 of the Patents Act has caused particular problems in Spain where case law has traditionally held that damages must be “real and effective” and strictly limited to those that are proven. Should the patentee then have to prove damages if he opts for equivalent royalty which, after all, has nothing to do with any actual damage he has suffered? This has led to some rather confusing and contradictory case law and the development of the doctrine of “ex re ipsa” which seeks to somehow fit equivalent royalty into the traditional picture by saying that there is no need to prove the existence of damage if by the nature of the thing under analysis (res), the existence of damage is clear (from the thing itself). However it would have been much better to acknowledge that as equivalent royalty cannot really be equated with the continental law concept of damages, as then the question of proving damages does not even arise.

This is exactly what the Madrid Appeal Court has done in Judgment no. 25/2014 of 24 January 2014 in appeal no. 578/2012. The ruling sets out that the purpose of equivalent royalty is not to compensate a loss suffered by the patentee, but rather the illegitimate invasion of his exclusive right. The Court does not say that it is necessary to show that the existence of a loss is self-evident (ex re ipsa) but rather that there is no need to prove or even consider any such loss. This comes as good news to patentees who up to now ran the risk that a court might find that the loss was not as self evident as they claimed e.g. when the patentee himself is not exploiting the patent in Spain and has made no preparations to do so either directly or through the granting of licenses. Even better, the Court gives clear guidance on what type of equivalent license terms can be sought including an up front payment, a fixed minimum monthly royalty and variable royalty based on sales. This is good news for patent litigators in Spain where judges traditionally tend to be guarded in their damages awards.

Author:Colm Ahern

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